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130 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
At any rate, the power should be sparingly exerted so as to avoid antagon-
izing the press or throttling potentially valuable criticism19 Requiring
cases of constructive contempt to be heard by a different judge from the
one offended might be advisable as tending to diminish opposition to exer-
cise of the power.20  J. M. F.
EVIDENC--TESTIMONY OF SPEED OF AUTOmOnILE BASED ON AURAL PER-
cEPTIoNs-[Federal].-In a recent case testimony that an automobile was
"moving fast" based only on aural perceptions was admitted along with
other evidence to show negligence on the part of the driver and thereby
authorize recovery from him for death in a collision. Held, that especially
in view of the sufficiency of the other testimony to sustain the verdict, ad-
mission of such testimony was not reversible error.'
It is settled law that a person of ordinary intelligence, who has had an
opportunity for observation, is competent to render opinion as to speed
2
of an animal,3 a train,4 a street car,5 or an automobile.0 The courts have
been reluctant, however, to admit such evidence as to speed when it is based
on what the witness heard rather than on what he saw; and by the decided
weight of authority such evidence is regarded as inadmissible.' On examina-
tion, most of the cases which have been ostensibly regarded as contrary pre-
affect their correct determination and are properly the subject of contempt
proceedings. On the other hand such publications or oral utterances of
entirely retrospective bearing come within the sphere of authorized com-
ment unless they affect a judge personally, when he has his remedy in an
action of libel or slander as any other individual thus offended against."
People v. Albertson (1934) 242 App. Div. 450, 275 N. Y. S. 361, 363.
19. The instant case would be in contempt under either of the views set
forth as being a publication on a case still pending in the court concerning
which the comment is made. See cases cited supra, notes 6 and 7.
20. This requirement has been recommended by the United States Su-
preme Court. Cooke v. U. S. (1925) 267 U. S. 517, 539; Toledo Newspaper
Co. v. U. S. (C. C. A. 6, 1916) 237 Fed. 986, 988. It is also obligatory in
several states. See for instance Ind. Burns' Ann. Stats. (1933) tit. 3, secs.
911, 912.
1. Smith v. Doyle (App. D. C. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 341.
2. See Notes (1930) 70 A. L. R. 540 and (1935) 94 A. L. R. 1190.
3. 4 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) see. 1977; Nesbit v. Crosby (1902)
74 Conn. 554, 51 AtI. 550; Chicago City R. R. Co. v. Matthieson (1904)
212 Ill. 292, 72 N. E. 443.
4. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Hall (1895) 105 Ala. 599, 17 So. 176; Over-
toom v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. (1899) 181 II. 323, 54 N. E. 898; Hoppe v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. (1884) 61 Wis. 357, 21 N. W. 221.
5. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Bundy (1904) 210 Ill. 39, 71 N. E. 28; Johns-
ton v. Bay State Ry. Co. (1916) 222 Mass. 583, 111 N. E. 391.
6. Denver Omnibus and Cab Co. v. Krebs (C. C. A. 8, 1919) 255 Fed.
543; Galloway v. Perkins (1916) 198 Ala. 658, 73 So. 956; Waltring v.
James (1920) 136 Md. 406, 111 Atl. 125.
7. Note, L. R. A. 1918A, 662; Williams v. Kansas City S. & M. R. Co.
(1888) 96 Mo. 275, 9 S. W. 573; Campbell v. St. Louis & Suburban R. Co.
(1903) 175 Mo. 161, 75 S. W. 86; Parsons v. Syracuse B & R. Co. (1909)
133 App. Div. 461, 117 N. Y. S. 1058.
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sent significant differences from the typical situation. One court permitted a
witness to describe the speed of a horse by the sound made on the purely
mechanical reasoning that the law permits evidence of speed on the basis
of sensual perceptions and that it does not discriminate between the various
senses, such as visual and aural." Another court admitted such evidence
as to the speed of a train on the ground that, though to the ear minute
distinctions in speed might not be discernible, it would be quite simple so
to distinguish between rapidly and slowly moving trains.9 Some courts,
especially in train cases, have conditioned the admission of such testimony
upon the laying of a foundation that the witness has been acquainted with
the vehicle and its noise of operation before the instance in question. 10 Of
the cases usually cited some are scarcely authority for admissibility inas-
much as both visual and aural perceptions were used as bases for the testi-
mony."
Opinion as to the speed of a motor vehicle based only on the sense of
hearing has been refused admission unless the witness qualifies as an ex-
pert,1 2 apparently on the ground that the mere sound of a motor 13 or of
an exhaust 14 furnishes an insufficient basis for ascertaining the speed of an
automobile. On the basis of precedents the consideration given the question
in the present case seems to proceed on acceptance of inexact analogies
drawn from train, horse, and street car cases.
In accordance with the modern trend to admit opinion evidence, subject
to explanation, and to permit the jury to determine its weight,' 5 at least
two theories may be suggested by means of which such evidence might be
brought within the principle of the cited cases. First, expert testimony is
an established exception to the general rule that a witness may not testify
as to speed on the basis of sound.16 Second, the lay witness may well be
qualified, on the basis of the above mentioned cases, to give such testimony
if familiarity with the car, its noise of operation, and the road in question
could be shown.' It is regrettable that the court in the instant case went
no further in its discussion than simply to select, without analysis, the cases
sustaining admission of the evidence in question, none of which were cases
involving automobile accidents. C. J. D.
8. Nesbit v. Crosby (1902) 74 Conn. 554, 51 Atl. 550.
9. Van Horn v. Burlington C. R. & N. R. Co. (1882) 59 Iowa 33, 12
N. W. 752.
10. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Moore (1912) 51 Ind. App. 110, 97 N. E.
203; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hildebrand (1893) 52 Kan. 284, 34 Pac.
738.
11. Cargall v. Riley (1923) 209 Ala. 183, 95 So. 21; Hamilton v. De
Camp (1926) 120 Kan. 645, 244 Pac. 105.
12. Kuhn v. Stephenson (1928) 87 Ind. App. 157, 161 N. E. 384; Camp-
bell v. St. Louis & Suburban R. Co. (1903) 175 Mo. 161, 75 S. W. 86.
13. Challinor v. Axton (1932) 246 Ky. 76, 54 S. W. (2d) 600; Johnson
v. Wilson (Ind. App. 1936) 200 N. E. 729, rev'd on other grounds (Ind.
1937) 5 N. E. (2d) 533; Wright v. Crain (1905) 142 Mich. 508, 106
N. W. 71.
14. Laubach v. Colley (1925) 283 Pa. 366, 129 Atl. 88.
15. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 507.
16. See cases cited, supra, note 12.
17. See cases cited, supra, note 10.
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